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Introduction
Immigration continues to be one of the most important factors in the demographic evolution of the United States. Immigrants and their offspring will account for as much as two thirds of population growth from 1995 to 2050. 1 And its effects will be particularly salient in the areas where immigrants cluster. In 2000, 68 percent of all foreign-born persons (as opposed to 36 percent of the native population) lived in only six states: California, New York, Florida, Texas, New Jersey or Illinois. 2 Major American metropolitan areas, such as New York, Los Angeles, Miami and San Francisco, have seen levels of new legal immigration equal to more than 13%
of their initial population in only fifteen years (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) ). 3 What is the local impact of such immigration inflows in American cities? To answer this question, economists have focused on wage impacts and have found only small effects. 4 In this paper I argue for the importance of the housing market and find an impact on the purchasing power of renters that is an order of magnitude bigger than the estimates from the wage literature. The results are very important in understanding the local distributive impact of immigration and the link between immigration and the residential location decisions of natives.
Housing markets can no longer be ignored when studying the local economic impact of immigration. Immigrants will represent a sort of new "baby boom" for the American housing markets of the 21 st century. Already, from 1980 to 1998, foreign-born renter households increased their share of total renter-occupied housing from 15% to 28% in the Northeastern and Western states. Immigrant households accounted for a third of total household growth during the 1995-2000 period (JCHS, 2000 (JCHS, , 2001 . And immigration determines housing demand to an even greater extent in those metropolitan areas where the foreign born tend to settle. 1 The National Research Council study (NRC, 1997) provides a comprehensive review of the demographic importance of immigration in the United States.
2 See Passel and Zimmerman (2001). 3 In Table A .1 I show these major "immigrant cities." 4 Studies on wage impacts represent the bulk of the research on immigration in economics. However, it is only fair to acknowledge studies on fiscal impacts (e.g. Borjas and Hilton, 1996) , natural resources (Simon, 1999, Chapter 9), college admissions for minorities (Hoxby, 1998) , native self-employment (Fairlie and Meyer, 2000) , unemployment (Gross, 1999; Gang and Rivera-Batiz, 1999 ) and the impact of foreign teaching fellows, like this author, on the academic performance of US undergraduates (Borjas, 2000) .
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This paper uses annual data on legal immigration inflows and decennial data on the stock of the foreign-born, housing rents, and home values at the metropolitan area level. The evidence suggests that part of the distributive impact of immigration on local economies may come through changes in rents and housing prices. I use longitudinal and cross-sectional data and find that cities with major inflows of immigrants experienced higher rent growth during the period 1983-1997. Legal immigration inflows equal to 1% of a city's population were associated with increases in housing rents and prices of about 1%. I include state fixed effects to account for different regional trends that could be spuriously correlated with the immigrants' geographic patterns of settlement. I further use annual differences in immigration inflows by city, and find that rents accelerate when immigration inflows into a metropolitan area variables that use immigration levels to predict subsequent inflows, and MSA fixed effects regressions that are identified by using within-city variation in the immigration inflows between censuses yield similar results.
The findings in this paper contrast sharply with the results from the labor literature on immigration (Borjas, 1994a; Friedberg and Hunt, 1995) . Studies that use historical data find a negative local association between immigration and wages in periods previous to WWI (Goldin, 1994; Ferrie, 1996a) . But remarkably, there is not much evidence of such a relationship holding in the contemporaneous metropolitan US. 5 Even unexpected immigration 5 Structural models of the economy that use realistic parameters to calibrate a simple model of labor demand predict an impact of immigration on wages at the national level (Borjas, Freeman and Katz, 1992 ).
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shocks that rapidly expand the local labor supply do not seem to decrease wages (Card, 1990 ).
There have been so far at least three possible explanations for this surprising result. Natives may be choosing to leave when immigrants arrive, rather than face increased competition in the labor market (Filer, 1992) ; immigrants may be moving into cities with positive shocks in productivity and wage growth; or the local labor demand may be more elastic than economists have thought (Card and Krueger, 1995) . The evidence in this work supplies the literature with a new piece in the puzzle of the local impact of immigration. It shows a potential way in which immigrants can have a local distributive impact. Furthermore, it suggests another major mechanism by which immigration can affect the migration decisions of natives. Rents and housing prices should not be neglected when thinking about the "dynamic process through which natives respond to these supply shocks and reestablish labor market equilibrium" (Borjas, 1994a) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some stylized facts about the housing conditions of immigrants. It also describes the scant previous research about the impact of immigration on housing markets, and the empirical challenges of such an exercise.
Section 3 reviews some ideas that are relevant to the economics of immigration and housing prices. I lay out a simple model that studies the response of the housing market in the short run and the long run. The model also contemplates mobility by natives and the interplay between labor and housing markets. Section 4 describes the data sources. Section 5 introduces the methodology and results of the paper. Section 6 concludes.
The empirics of immigration and housing
Few papers have addressed the topic of immigration and the housing market. A number of studies describe the housing condition of immigrants. We know that immigrants tend to live in rental housing (JCHS, 2000, Burnley, Murphy and Fagan, 1997) and in housing units of lower quality, especially during the period just after they arrive (Thave, 1999; Friedman, Rosenbamum and Schill, 1998). We also know that immigrants tend to consume less with respect to housing services: crowding is more frequent in immigrants' households (Myers, Baer and Choi, 1996) . 6 Over time, immigrants tend to resemble natives more in terms of crowding, home ownership and suburbanization patterns (Callis, 1997; Myers, 1999; Myers and Lee, 1996, Myers and Park, 1999) . 6 The demographic literature on crowding defines it as when a housing unit holds more than one person per room (not including kitchens, baths and the like).
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Much less is known about the impact of immigrants in destination cities. Muller and Espenhade (1985) report that rental housing experienced major price increases in Los Angeles, compared to other American metropolitan areas, during the period 1967-83. Los Angeles was one of the most important "gateway" cities for immigration in that period. The authors go on to explain this finding: "because most immigrants live in rental units, the rental housing market would experience substantial pressure from the rising immigrant-induced demand."
The evidence points to housing markets as a possible way to find the local effects of immigration. Immigration was the most likely explanation for this differential growth in rents; but the differences-in-differences approach that Saiz (2003) uses has shortcomings that are worth mentioning. Different trends in the "treatment" and "control" groups can generate spurious results. 9 This criticism does not claim there is a systematic bias in the diffs-indiffs estimates, but suggests a potential lack of power of the methodology. A second shortcoming of the differences-in-differences approach is that, even if the econometrician can establish causality, the estimates need not be generalizable. Saiz (2003) measures the impact of a very big unexpected immigration shock on a very particular housing market, at a specific point in time.
The economics of immigration and rents
Why should we be specifically interested in the impact of immigration on rents? How is immigration different from general population growth? Is it surprising to find a substantial impact of immigration on local housing markets? From a housing market perspective, several facts distinguish immigration from general population growth.
Immigrants are much more spatially concentrated than natives. This is the housing market equivalent of the difference in the skill composition of the immigrant and native populations in the labor market (Borjas, 1994b 9 Other factors may have been at play in Miami during the early 80s. These factors may have affected rents differently in that metropolitan area. Angrist and Krueger (2000) show how another failed "Mariel boatlift"
in 1994 −thousand of Cubans took to the sea that year but were prevented from landing in Miami by the US Navy− could have been interpreted as having a negative effect on wages using a diffs-in-diffs methodology.
outside metropolitan areas. We can thus expect the effect of immigration to be stronger on specific housing markets. The factors attracting immigrants to "immigrant cities" are different from the factors motivating natives to migrate. Immigrants are attracted to cities with strong immigrant and ethnic networks. Natives are, by and large, indifferent to these networks. Some of the factors that explain migration by natives are employment, wages, amenities and, critically, housing prices -they tend to look for less expensive locations. Thus it would not be surprising to find a mild correlation between changes in housing prices and changes in native population. Immigration inflows may be more independent from changes in housing supply factors that explain rent growth.
Yet it is not obvious that we should actually see a local correlation between immigration and housing rents. Consider one of the arguments in the labor literature. Natives may move out or avoid areas where immigrants settle because of the competition in the local labor market. If immigrants substituted for natives "one for one" in the labor market, then we would not see any increase in the local demand for housing. Finding a positive local effect of immigration on rents allows us to reject the strong null of "complete displacement" in the labor market.
A similar argument applies to competition in the housing market. Immigrants may be less sensitive to housing rents, because local immigrant-specific amenities and networks are more important for them. Natives, though, may be more sensitive to local rents. If this is the case, immigration inflows could spur net out-migration of natives because of the increased housing costs that are associated with a housing demand shock. There is no way to separate the effect of increased housing demand (immigration) from the potential decreased demand (native outmigration). Part of the local response to the treatment (immigration) can occur through native out-migration. In this case, we need to be careful about the interpretation of the coefficient of immigration on rents. In general it will not correspond to the housing supply elasticity.
Nevertheless, we should expect a positive effect of immigration on rents if natives are not infinitely sensitive to changes in housing costs, and if they are not displaced "one for one" in the labor market.
I introduce a simple model that incorporates all these ideas. This model can be used as a roadmap to understand the local impact of immigration on housing. It is structured around the idea of spatial equilibrium with simple supply and demand schedules. The focus is on partial equilibrium: I concentrate on the effects of immigration on a city, which I will name city C. The model contemplates housing supply and the mobility of natives.
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Start by assuming that the preferences of native residents can be represented by the following separable utility function:
V is the value of local amenities in city C for individual i, h is the consumption of housing services by the individual. C w is the going wage in city C ; all city dwellers are assumed to be also workers and C w to be a function of the population ( N ). R stands for housing rents (the annual cost of a dwelling). The model abstracts from income effects in housing consumption.
The optimal consumption of housing in this setup is given by
The preferences for the city's amenities are distributed uniformly. We can order individuals according to their preferences for the city's amenities: { } The utility level outside the city is u . Residents in the city prefer staying to emigrating, so
. The marginal native will be indifferent between staying at C and leaving.
(2)
From this equation we derive the supply of natives in C :
, where
Immigrants are attracted to particular cities because of the existence of previous immigrant communities. Local public goods (such as social networks, schools, language usage, and existence of restaurants and specialized shops) increase the amenity value of such cities from their point of view. The existence of such immigrant-specific amenities in some cities is a well-8 established fact in the literature. 10 is an amenity premium for immigrants in "immigrant cities." For the purposes of this work, the only distinction between immigrants and natives is a preference for specific "immigrant" cities. Immigrants will always prefer C. I treat the supply of immigration into city C as exogenous to the initial spatial equilibrium. My empirical specifications try to make this assumption as accurate as possible.
The optimal consumption of housing services for immigrants will be identical to the consumption of natives. Let total population Taking logarithms of this identity:
Let's first analyze the effects of an unexpected immigration shock in the short run. I define the short run as the situation in which supply of housing space and native population cannot change (because of arbitrarily high adjustment costs in the short run). Differentiating equation (4) with respect to the number of immigrants, we obtain the short run impact of unexpected immigration: Portes and Rumbaut, (1996) , Rumbaut (1997) . Zhou (1998) reports that "over two thirds of the legal immigrants admitted to the United States since the 1970s are family-sponsored immigrants. Even among employer-sponsored migrants, the role of networking is crucial. Family, kin, and friendship networks also tend to expand exponentially serving as a conduit to additional and thus potentially self-perpetuating migration."
So the percentage change in rents depends on the "immigration impact" (number of immigrants over population) and the elasticity of the demand for space. All of the adjustment in the short run comes through changes in the demand for space of residents.
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For expected immigration shocks, or for learning about the dynamic effects of unexpected shocks, we have to consider both the adjustment of the housing supply, the response of native population, and changes in housing space consumption.
The price elasticity of housing supply is assumed constant:
It is well known that changes in housing prices exhibit a high degree of auto-correlation (Case and Shiller, 1999) . Contrary to what happens in other asset markets, contemporary changes in prices have predictive power over future price changes. Prices do not fully adjust instantaneously despite the fact that the agents can estimate the steady state price. In order to illustrate the dynamics of housing prices I follow recent papers in the real estate literature, 12 which postulates an error correction process with respect to the steady state price ( * P ).
( )
The steady state housing price capitalizes the steady state housing rent at interest rate i.
What is the steady state impact of an immigration shock on housing rents? Housing demand (4) equals housing supply (6) in the steady state (I henceforth drop the stars in the steady state variables for ease of exposition). Combining the equilibrium condition with (8) we obtain:
This effect can be interpreted as reduction in vacancy rates, increased crowding or conversion of other spaces to residential usage. 12 Meese and Wallace (1997), Malpezzi (1999) , Capozza, Hendershott, Mack, and Mayer (2002). 13 i can be interpreted here more generally as the user cost of residential capital.
10
Differentiating with respect to I N :
we know that:
Substituting in (10) and rearranging yields:
The impact of expected immigration inflows (or the long run effect of unexpected shocks) is smaller than the short run impact of unexpected shocks. New supply of housing, changes in the consumption of space, and out-migration of natives account for this result. At the same time, even in the long run, immigration is expected to have an impact on rents and prices in receiving cities as long as there are natives with a positive consumer surplus derived from living in city C. It is straightforward to show that:
, and 0
Thus the impact of immigration on rents is lower in cities with elastic housing supply or, less intuitively, in cities with inelastic labor demand, and higher in cities with low price elasticity of housing demand or inelastic supply of natives (i.e. low mobility).
Although not central for the empirical exercise in this paper, it is interesting to discuss some aspects of the interaction between labor markets and the housing impact of immigration.
14 For the later result, I assume that the initial consumption of space is greater than 1 unit (h>1).
Concretely, consider the strong null hypothesis that natives are displaced one by one from the city because of competition in the labor market. This would certainly explain the apparent lack of a wage impact of immigration in cross-sectional studies. Formally this can be expressed as ( )
For this condition to hold, it is necessary that either 0 a = (i.e. natives are extremely mobile and sensitive to changes in consumption), or ρ → ∞ (totally inelastic labor demand). Both of these cases imply, in equation (13) that 0
finding a local impact of immigration on rents helps us to discard the strong null hypothesis of complete displacement in local labor markets.
But then again, wouldn't it be enough to look at population (or employment) net inflows to ascertain if immigration has a local economic impact? The answer to that question is no.
Think about a city with a very inelastic housing supply. Assume that the demand for space is relatively inelastic, maybe because of indivisibilities in the existing housing stock. Under this scenario most of the impact of immigration is on housing rents, as opposed to population. As the size of the labor force does not change much, the wage impact of immigration is bound to be small. An outside observer of this scenario may conclude that competition in the labor market drives natives out of the city: i.e. labor demand is inelastic or the supply of natives is very elastic. In fact, neither of these two needs to be true. New immigrants are simply willing to bid up for locations at immigrant cities.
What are the dynamics of rents and prices after an immigration shock? From equation (7) we obtain:
Where * P is the steady state price after the immigration shock and (0) P is the initial steady state price. From (8) it follows that in the steady state comparative statics 1 1
, and thus from (15) that ( )
The housing market is in equilibrium at any point in time:
The supply of natives is a function of rents at time t and using (3):
Differentiating with respect to time and rearranging we can show:
In the model, rents experience a shock after the immigration inflow and decrease thereafter toward the new steady state, which is higher than the initial one. Thus one has to be careful separating the short run and long run impacts of immigration on rents. Concretely, identification techniques based on unexpected major shocks, as in Saiz (2003), will tend to overestimate the long run impact of immigration, while identifying its short run effects. 
Data
In order to assess the impact of immigration inflows on housing markets I have assembled data on rents, housing prices, immigration, income, employment and other characteristics of the US metropolitan areas during the periods 1983-1997, and decennial data for 1970-2000. In this section I describe and summarize the data that I use in the empirical part. A more detailed explanation of how variables are constructed can be found in the data Appendix.
One data source for the immigration inflows is the Immigration and Naturalization Service 13 metropolitan statistical areas using the census MABLE geo-correlation engine. 15 It is remarkable that the datasets contain annual individual information on all legal immigrants admitted in the United States. However, the data have several caveats that make it less than optimal. The timing of the admission of a foreign person as an immigrant needn't coincide with the date of entry into the US. Also, the data do not yield any information on illegal immigrants.
But there are several advantages that make the data attractive. First, most immigrants are admitted shortly after they arrive in the US. In 1990, the median year in my sample, 70 percent of admitted immigrants entered the country the same year in which they were admitted. About 90 percent of the immigrants admitted in 1990 report having arrived in the United States in or after 1988. Moreover, admission as an immigrant is by itself a treatment of considerable interest, since the counterfactual may imply having to leave the country or lacking the ability to work, and since it can be useful to forecast the impact of future immigration inflows with the data that is available annually. Thus I will treat these data as a noisy indicator of recent immigration inflows, and obtain a panel with about 292 MSAs and 15
years' worth of data. The measurement error will typically lead us to underestimate the impact of immigration when using higher frequencies. 16 Second, the data give us information about the nationality of all recent immigrants and I can link this with changes in economic and social conditions in their origin countries. Third the data provide information on the original destination of the immigrant so that the treatment is plausibly more exogenous to the subsequent evolution of rents in the metropolitan area.
An alternative data source for the number of immigrants by city is provided by the census.
Concretely, I use the change in the decennial number of foreign-born individuals by MSA. The benefits of using the census tabulations are that they enumerate both legal and illegal immigrants (and other inflows of foreign-born individuals) and that they provide a relatively accurate head-count of the number of immigrants by metropolitan area. The costs of using the census tabulations are the reduction in the periodicity (only each ten years), the loss of some micro information, 17 and the fact that, between censuses, immigrants may decide to resettle to 15 I calculate immigration inflows using calendar years rather than fiscal year (both are present in the data). 16 Note that the instrumental variables approaches will also help us deal with attenuation bias. 17 Census micro data samples do not allow to identify all metropolitan areas. Moreover, there is no detailed information on year of arrival in the present metropolitan area.
14 locations that are becoming relatively cheaper. In any case, it is remarkable that the results from using both types of immigration data are very similar.
A data source for rents in MSAs is the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Fair Market Rent series (FMR). Fair market rents for a fiscal year are determined before October of the previous calendar year. 18 The main unit of observation in most of the empirical work is the MSA-year. In Table 1 
Methodology and Results
Least squares results
In section 3 I established that, ceteris paribus, the immigration impact should be one of the determinants of rents and housing price growth. The empirical model that I posit takes the form:
The dependent variable is the annual change in the log of rents. 21 Taking differences in the rents series increases the noise to signal ratio of the dependent variable but gets rid of cityspecific characteristics that account for rent levels. The main independent variable is annual inflow of legal immigrants (INS data) over population. b has an intuitive interpretation here as the percentage change in rents corresponding to an annual inflow of immigrants equal to 1% of the city's population. As rents do not adjust instantaneously to changes in fundamentals (Genesove, 1999 ) I use lagged values of the dynamic independent variables. To decide on the lags in the dynamic explanatory variables I used the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and concluded that the specification with one lag was the "most likely." 22 Levin and Lin (1992) tests on the data for rents, and prices reveal stationarity in the first differences. Thus spurious regression seems not to be problem in this specification, though note that if there is a longer term cointegrating relationship between rent levels and the size of foreign born population we may be underestimating the parameter of interest.
23 Table 5 shows the results of the first differences specification. I present the OLS regressions with standard errors clustered by MSA. I also show regressions using maximum likelihood estimation of a model with ARMA(2,2) perturbations to address the possible existence 21 I have estimated more general dynamic panel data models that use the current rent as dependent variable and one lag in rents as independent variable, besides the other variables in the model. I implemented the GMM procedure in Arellano and Bond (1991), but specification tests failed to confirm the validity of the model, since second order autocorrelation in the residuals was detected. The qualitative results are similar for rents, but the specification for prices is extremely sensitive to changes in the set of explanatory variables. 22 The AIC is commonly used to settle on the lag specification of time-series models: the specification that minimizes AIC is usually chosen. I posit specifications similar to the one in Table 2, The shortcoming in the estimates is that a major part of the variance in immigration inflows is between cities. Omitted variables that are differentially present in cities with high immigration inflows, and that might account the growth in rents in these cities (such as amenities whose valuation increases over time), are a potential threat to my interpretation of the results. A first solution to the potential problem is to control for omitted variables that are common to all
MSAs in a state. These may be, for instance, geographical advantages, regional demographics and state-specific shocks that are not captured in the income and employment variables.
Columns (3) and (6) show the first-differences regressions including state fixed-effects. This is equivalent to allowing state specific trends in the evolution of rents and prices. The results do not change much; differences in immigration between cities within a state seem to have an equally strong impact on rents.
To eliminate the possibility of city-specific trends that are correlated with immigration levels I make use of the model in second differences:
The model is identified through changes in the general level of new immigration into a city. Even if immigrants are generally attracted to a city because of factors that also drive the trend in rent growth, year to year changes in immigration inflows should be relatively independent of those factors. Do rents accelerate when immigration accelerates? The answer to this question is also in Table 2 : yes. At the same time that 24 The covariance of the difference of the perturbation terms is different from zero for two consecutive observations: the specification in second differences prevents the omitted variables problem, the results capture the impact of unexpected immigration. Differences in the immigration inflows by year can be interpreted as "surprises." As the model predicted, unexpected changes in immigration cause higher rent growth. The estimate is large compared to those of the other methods: an increase in immigration equal to 1% of the population induces a rent hike of 3.75%. Changes in prices are not significant in this specification.
Instrumental Variables Estimates
In this section I develop an instrumental variables' strategy to deal with the endogeneity problem. The evidence I obtain will be generalizable to regular (expected) immigration flows, and will not be dependent on major immigration "shocks."
I make use of two kinds of instrumental variables. The first instrumental variable approach focuses on year-to-year changes in immigration inflows. There are good reasons to believe that the overall number of legal immigrants in the United States stems from political and administrative decisions. 25 I make use of this variation to construct a "shift-share" prediction of the inflows by city and year. Total immigration levels in the US are translated into expected immigration by city. I use the cities of destination of immigrants in 1983, the first year for which I have data on the location of legal immigrants, and the formula: words, immigrants in 1983 did not predict the future evolution of housing rents and prices better than the participants in the local market. 26 The second identifying assumption is the exogeneity of annual changes in the national immigration inflows to the economic conditions of immigrant cities.
The second IV approach relaxes this second assumption and consists in estimating annual immigration inflows by country and year. To do so, I use variables that are exogenous to changes in city-specific amenities. Once I have predicted immigration inflows by country and year I calculate the share of immigration by country into each MSA in 1983. I apply this share to predict the number of immigrants from each country into that city for the period 1984-1998. Finally, I consolidate these flows to obtain the total predicted immigration by city-year.
This instrument takes the form: of the sending countries' characteristics: the log of income per capita, log of population, log of the real exchange rate, dummies for the presence of miltary conflicts, collapse of state institution and transition out of communism, and the log of the number of immigrants from that country in 1979 (the first year for which the data is available). Income per capita is negatively related to the number of immigrants sent to the Unites States. The log of a country's population is also a significant determinant of the number of immigrants from that country. Real exchange rates have been shown to be an important determinant for Mexican 26 Prices capitalize the discounted value of future rents and I find similar or bigger impacts of immigration on housing prices throughout the paper. Therefore, if one believed in the ability of immigrants in 1983 to pick the future "winner" cities (1984-1997) based on the available information, one has to explain why local participants in the housing market did not capitalize on the available information ex ante.
immigration (Hanson and Spilimbergo, 1999) . I measure the exchange rate as the unit of foreign "gadgets" that one can buy by selling a "gadget" produced in the U.S, priced at U.S prices and given the current exchange rate and prices in the sending country. 27 the estimates from our previous specifications may be quantitatively far from the actual long run effect. An additional advantage of the specification using "long" changes in rents and cumulative immigration is that they rely less in the reported timing of immigration, and are thus less sensitive to attenuation bias or potential non-classical measurement error in the yearly inflows. Table 4 presents the results for rents and prices respectively. The left-hand-side variable is the change in the log of rents (prices) from 1984 to 1998. The main right-hand-side variables is the "potential supply" of immigrants over initial population (i.e. the total cumulative number of immigrants who reported settling in the city during the period 1983-1997 over population in 1983). 28 Since most cities experience population growth, using the initial population in the 27 Cointegration tests in this context are not extremely informative. The time dimension is very short (13 periods). Furthermore, the null hypothesis of cointegration usually involves cointegration of all of the MSA series: rejecting that hypothesis does not imply that some or even most of the series are cointegrated. 28 There are three arguments on why such "potential supply" is the treatment of interest. First, immigrants are no less concentrated in locations with major immigrant populations after 20 years residing in the United
States (Ferrie, 1996b ). This suggests a strong "stickiness" of immigration to the initial "ports of entry."
Indeed, in footnote 29 I provide evidence between the one-to-one relationship between cumulative number of immigrants and change in population. Second, one may be interested in the "intention to treat" impact of immigration. Even if some of the immigrants leave the areas of initial settlement, it is important to know how the housing market responded for each immigrant that arrived in a city, in order to derive policy implications and forecasts, with the immigration data available. Third, and more importantly, "potential immigration" is the actual potentially exogenous treatment variable of theoretical interest. Internal migration of immigrants will be caused by changes in the conditions of the cities where the immigrants settle. These changes are endogenous to initial immigration inflows. We know that the local wage effects of immigration are small. Thus, a substantial part of an eventual out-migration of the foreign-born from denominator of this variable yields conservative (low) estimates of the parameter of interest. I also control for the changes in the log of income per capita during that period, and the rest variables that describe the initial conditions: unemployment, weather, crime, central city area, and percent with bachelor's degree in 1980.
The results are very robust across all specifications and suggest impacts on rents and prices of 0.8-1.6% for an immigration inflow that amounts to 1% of the initial population. In general, point estimates for housing prices are higher, but I cannot reject that they are equivalent to those for rents. Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 use the cumulative prediction from the origin countries' random effects estimation as an instrumental variable. In columns 3 and 6 I include the change in population other than immigrants (change in total population minus the estimated number of legal immigrants) 29 over initial population as an additional explanatory variable. The correlation between this variable and changes in rents and prices is not significant. Natives seem to be attracted to areas with relatively slow rent growth. However, as we will see latter, measurement error in the intercensal estimates of metropolitan population (1983 and 1997) is probably biasing down the association between population growth and changes in rents.
Quality
Another issue is the quality of the housing units in the HUD sample. The Freddie Mac (FM) measure of prices is based on a repeated sales index. The same units are tracked in time, and changes in quality must be small. The Fair Market Rent measure does not have this property.
If the quality of housing increased systematically in "immigrant cities," maybe because growing cities tend to have housing units of newer vintages, my estimates could just be reflecting the effect of quality on rents. Conversely, immigration could actually be associated "immigrant cities" might be attributed to local changes in housing costs. It is clear that people who have left a city because of the high housing costs are still part of the demand of housing in that city (if the price was low enough they would have bought housing services in the city). To clarify this point, imagine a city with a completely inelastic housing supply. Assume that everyone consumes the same quantity of housing services.
In this setup, any immigration inflow will be associated with a population outflow of the same magnitude.
Still, the greater the number of immigrants the greater the demand for housing in the city and the higher the rents: the number of net migrants to the city would be the wrong variable to use. 28 Results do not change much if I include the lagged independent variable in a simple fixed effects model (unreported regression available on request). with lower qualities, and the previous results would then be biased downward. I address this issue using microdata from the 1985 and 1995 samples of the American Housing Survey. 30 The AHS provides several quality indicators that I will use as controls. An additional advantage of using the AHS is to check on the robustness of my previous findings on alternative data sources. In Table 5 , the log of reported rent for each unit in both years is the left-hand-side Areas where immigrants settled tended to experience higher rent growth. The introduction of quality indicators (column 2) does not change the coefficient of interest.
5.6.
The foreign-born, rents and prices: using the decennial censuses. about 260,000 foreign-born residents emigrated annually from the United States in the 30 I restrict the sample to private metropolitan rental units for which the rent is reported. 31 As most units appear in both samples, I further cluster standard errors by unit.
90s. The estimated number of annual illegal aliens entering the country was 281,000 for 1988-92 and 275,000 for 1992-1996 (INS, 1999). The effects of illegal immigration and emigration of the foreign-born may cancel each other to some extent. Secondly, it is unlikely that the correlation between legal and illegal inflows is equal to one.
In any case, a way to approach the issue of the foreign born persons who are not legal immigrants is by using census data counts at the MSA level. The census counts most foreignborn residents, irrespective of their immigrant status. 32 The other advantage of using the census over the INS data is that it is free of measurement error in the reporting of the locations where the foreign born person decides to settle. The main disadvantage of the census is its periodicity. I will only be able to consider the "long" changes in rents and prices between the census years for which I have complete data (1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000) . The other disadvantage of the census is that we do not obtain the MSA in which the immigrant first settled. Actual residence in an MSA may be endogenous to the rent level in the city.
Theoretically, with a very inelastic housing supply, new immigration could have an impact on rents even if the net migration of the foreign born into the city is small. Using instrumental variables techniques may help us deal with that problem. Table 6 presents the results from a regression where the decadal change in the census-reported log of the median rent or house value in the MSA are the main dependent variables. The change in the number of the foreign-born between two census years over population in the initial year is the main explanatory variable. As a data check for the quality of the selfreported data, and in order to account for some of the changes in unobserved quality, I also present the results with the repeated sales index. The data is a panel of 283 MSAs with complete data and 3 decades of growth in the foreign-born population. I use similar controls as in the previous regressions. 33 OLS results (columns 1, 4 and 9) are remarkably consistent with the previous specifications. The parameter of interest is robust to the use of very different data sources. 32 There may be some concerns about the undercount of illegal immigrants in specific areas, but we can hardly improve on the census counts. 33 The MSA definition here is the 1999 county-based one (see data Appendix). I have data for murder rates Columns 3, 6 and 10 introduce MSA fixed effects. The fixed effects should control for the impact of city-specific amenities (or changes in the valuation of amenities) that were associated with rent growth during the period. 34 The identification there comes from quantitative changes in immigration within a city, rather than on the cross-sectional variation in the share of immigrants. Clearly, rent and house price growth in a city accelerated in the decades with bigger immigration inflows. The parameter estimates are bigger than with the OLS specification, albeit the parameters are more imprecisely estimated. The fact that rent and price growth accelerates when immigration inflows accelerate is consistent with a causal interpretation of the results.
In columns 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, and 12 I use an IV strategy in order to deal with the fact that changes in the location of the foreign-born are driven by housing costs and may be correlated with other relevant omitted variables. I predict the MSA change in the foreign-born according to the formula:
foreign is the number of foreign-born people in city i at time t , and , US t foreign the number of foreign born in the US at time t . This basically amounts to multiply the initial level of the foreign born by the national growth rate in the number of foreign born persons, and thus is in the tradition of using initial immigration levels to predict subsequent inflows (Altonji an Card, 1991) . I then divide by initial population to generate a prediction for the expected immigration impact in each city. The results suggest a somewhat lower elasticity of about 0.5 for rents and prices. 35 When we control for other population growth, however, the estimates increase and suggest an elasticity of 0.8. The change is explained by the fact that the partial correlation between changes in native population and the initial share of the foreign born is negative. The census measure of the change in the native population yields a strong positive impact of population growth on rents and prices. However, and consistent with the 34 Note that adding fixed effects to a model in differences will increase the noise-to-signal rate in the dependent variable. In this case, however, I have decennial changes in rents and prices, which are bound to be much less noisy than annual changes. 35 Unfortunately I cannot combine the IV and fixed effects approach. The shares of the foreign born by city do not change much in each decade and the city and year fixed effects capture all of the variance in the instrument. The instrument is not significant in the first stage with MSA fixed effects and the F-statistic for the excluded instrument is only 0.80.
idea that native migration is more endogenous to local changes in the cost of living, this association is about 2-3 times weaker than the association between immigration and rent growth. Figure 1 shows a kernel density estimate of the 32 parameters in tables 2-6. It is quite apparent that the mode of the estimates is around 1. I think that it is thus fair to conclude that an exogenous immigration impact that amounts to 1% of the initial population in a metropolitan area pushes up average rents and prices by around 1%.
Conclusions
This paper shows that there is a local economic impact of immigration in American cities. The table shows the results of a regression where the annual change in the logarithm of rents (prices) is the dependent variable and the number of new immigrants divided by population the previous year the main independent variable of interest. Rent and price data are from 1984 to 1998, and for all MSA with complete observations (unbalanced panel data). The regression also controls for annual changes in log income and unemployment rates, and for other time invariant MSA variables. The "US levels instrument" uses the total number of immigrants in the US each year and the share of immigrants going to each MSA in 1983 to predict the number of immigrants by MSA and year. The "origin country instrument" is a prediction of MSA yearly immigration inflows based on "expected" immigration by country and the shares of immigrants of each nationality settling into each MSA in 1983.
Notes: Standard errors clustered by MSA in parentheses. ∆ indicates first difference. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. First differences for years 85 to 97: observations with all explanatory variables complete. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
The table shows the results of a regression where the long difference (change from 1984 to 1998) in the logarithm of rents (prices) is the dependent variable and the number of new immigrants during the period 1983-1997 divided by initial population (1983) is the main independent variable of interest. Rent and price data are from 1984 to 1998, and for all MSA with complete observations. The regression also controls for annual changes in log income and employment rates, and for other time invariant MSA variables. The IV (instrumental variables) specifications use the "origin country" instrument. The "origin country instrument" is a prediction of MSA yearly immigration inflows based on "expected" immigration by country and the shares of immigrants of each nationality settling into each MSA in 1983. Notes: Standard errors clustered by unit in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
TABLE 5 Micro Data AHS: Rents and Qualities
Log rent at T (T=1985,1995)
Immigration impact stands for the number of immigrants during the 1984-1994 period divided by 1984 population. The impact is instrumented by the prediction from the "origin countries" IV. The table shows the regression where the intercensal change in the log of median rents or house prices is the main dependent variable and the change in the number of immigrants over initial MSA population the main independent variable. All changes between Census years (1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000) . Most control variables take values in the initial census year. Instrumental variables use the total decennial change in foreign born interacted with the share of foreign-born population in the initial year.
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Census Data: 1970 Data: , 1980 Data: , 1990 Data: and 2000 
Merging immigrant inflows with origin country data:
Some of the countries in the INS files disappeared (merged or split). The World Bank data is reported for currently existing countries. I assign the individuals from these countries to a major "anchor" country as follows:
